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Cabinet Action and the CRTC: 
An Examination of Section 23 
of the Broadcasting Act 
Donna SOBLE KAUFMAN * 
L'article 23 de la Loi sur la radiodiffusion prévoit que le gouverneur en 
conseil peut annuler ou renvoyer au Conseil de la radiodiffusion et des 
télécommunications canadiennes, pour un nouvel examen ou une nouvelle 
audition, lattribution, la modification ou le renouvellement de toute licence de 
radiodiffusion. Cette disposition manque de précision et la procédure suivie par 
le Cabinet reste obscure. En effet l'on ne sait trop si des parties intéressées 
peuvent s'adresser au Cabinet, ou si leur demande l'atteindra effectivement. 
Cet article analyse la législation pertinente, les situations dans lesquelles 
le Cabinet est intervenu (quelques-unes dans lesquelles il s'est abstenu), et les 
mécanismes de la procédure. Cette dernière partie est basée sur des interviews 
menées auprès de personnes participant à cette procédure, et elle en démontre le 
caractère possiblement inéquitable. 
L'auteur conclut que le pouvoir de révision du Cabinet devrait être 
maintenu mais que sa mise en œuvre devrait être orientée par des normes. 
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Avant-propos 
The basic research for this paper was carried out in Ottawa, Toronto 
and Montréal in 1984 and early 1985. Because there is very little current 
doctrine or case law available on the subject, I conducted a series of personal 
interviews in order to piece together the situation as it exists today. I am 
fortunate that so many participants in the process agreed to assist me in this 
project. They were more than generous with their time and the information 
they furnished was exceedingly helpful. They are, in alphabetical order : 
Lome H. Abugov, André Bureau, Q.C., Jack Burghardt, M.P., Avrum 
Cohen, John T. Coleman, R.S. Engle, Edwin A. Goodman, Q.C., Alain 
Gourd, Senator Jerry Grafstein, The Honourable Herb Gray, P.C., Q.C., 
M.P., Denis Guay, Norah M.C. Hockin, William A. Howard, Ian A.M. 
Ironside, T. Gregory Kane, Dr. Jake V. Th. Knoppers, Dean R.A. 
Macdonald, Senator P. Michael Pitfield, P.C., Q.C., Robert Rabinovitch, 
Professor Ed Ratushny, Kathryn Robinson, Geoff Scott, M.P., and Shirley 
Serafini. 
This article is substantially based on these interviews. All information 
has been verified to the extent that it was possible to do so. Facts which are 
not attributed to other sources were provided by one or more of the persons 
mentioned above. 
Introduction 
It is doubtful whether anyone can define precisely some optimal balance 
among political, administrative and judicial mechanisms of review.1 
It is the scope and purpose of this paper to examine the nature and 
extent of Cabinet review in relation to broadcasting decisions made by the 
1. P.G. THOMAS, "Administrative law reform : legal versus political controls on administrative 
discretion", (1984) 27 Canadian Public Administration 120, 126. 
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Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunicat ions Commission, an 
"independent public authority" created by the Broadcasting Act.2 
The examination begins with a look at the relevant statutory enactments. 
This is followed by a discussion of the role of Cabinet and its members in the 
overall scheme of responsible government as it exists, in fact or in theory, in 
Canada today. The mechanics of the review process are set out, and the 
paper concludes with thoughts about this contentious procedure. 
1. The Broadcasting Act 
Section 23 of the Broadcasting Act states as follows : 
23.(1) The issue, amendment or 
renewal by the Commission of any broad-
casting licence may set aside, or may be 
referred back to the Commission for 
reconsideration and hearing by the 
Commission, by order of the Governor 
in Council made within sixty days after 
such issue, amendment or renewal, and 
subsection 19(4) shall not apply in respect 
of any such hearing. 
(2) An order of the Governor in 
Council made under subsection (1) that 
refers back to the Commission for recon-
sideration and hearing by it the issue, 
amendment or renewal of a licence shall 
set forth the details of any matter that, in 
the opinion of the Governor in Council, 
is material to the application and that, in 
his opinion, the Commission failed to 
consider or to consider adequately. 
(3) Where the issue, amendment or 
renewal of a broadcasting licence is 
referred back to the Commission under 
this section, the Commission shall recon-
sider the matter so referred back to it 
and, after a hearing as provided for by 
subsection (1), may 
(a) rescind the issue of the licence; 
23.(1) L'attribution, la modification 
ou le renouvellement par le Conseil de 
toute licence de radiodiffusion peuvent 
être annulés ou peuvent être renvoyés de 
nouveau au Conseil pour un nouvel 
examen et une nouvelle audition, sur 
décret du gouverneur en conseil rendu 
dans les soixante jours qui suivent cette 
attribution, cette modification ou ce 
renouvellement, et le paragraphe 19(4) 
ne s'applique pas relativement à une telle 
audition. 
(2) Un décret du gouverneur en conseil 
rendu aux termes du paragraphe (1) qui 
renvoie de nouveau au Conseil, en vue 
d'un nouvel examen et d'une nouvelle 
audition, l'attribution, la modification 
ou le renouvellement d'une licence, doit 
énoncer les détails de toute question qui, 
de l'avis du gouverneur en conseil, est 
pertinente à la demande et que, selon lui, 
le Conseil a omis d'examiner ou d'exa-
miner convenablement. 
(3) Lorsque l'attribution, la modifica-
tion ou le renouvellement d'une licence 
de radiodiffusion sont renvoyés de nou-
veau au Conseil en vertu du présent 
article, le Conseil doit examiner de nou-
veau la question ainsi renvoyée et, après 
l'audition prévue au paragraphe (1), il 
peut 
a) annuler l'attribution de la licence; 
2. R.S.C. 1970, c. B-ll, as amended. 
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(b) rescind the issue of the licence and 
issue a licence on the same or different 
conditions to any other person ; 
(c) rescind the amendment or renewal ; 
or 
(d) confirm, either with or without 
change, variation or alteration, the issue, 
amendment or renewal. 
(4) The issue, amendment or renewal 
by the Commission of any broadcasting 
licence that has been referred back to the 
Commission pursuant to subsection (1) 
and confirmed pursuant to paragraph 
C$)(d) may by set aside by order of the 
Governor in Council made within sixty 
days after such confirmation. 1967-68, 
c. 25, s. 23. 
b) annuler l 'attribution de la licence et 
attribuer une licence dans les mêmes 
conditions ou dans des conditions diffé-
rentes à toute autre personne ; 
c) annuler la modification ou le renou-
vellement ; ou 
d) confirmer, avec ou sans change-
ment, l 'attribution, la modification ou le 
renouvellement. 
(4) L'attribution, la modification ou 
le renouvellement par le Conseil de toute 
licence de radiodiffusion qui ont été ren-
voyés au Conseil en conformité du para-
graphe (1) et confirmés en conformité de 
l'alinéa (3)d) peuvent être annulés par 
décret du gouverneur en conseil rendu 
dans les soixante jours qui suivent cette 
confirmation. 1967-68, c. 25, art. 23. 
Whi l e these a re a posteriori p o w e r s , it s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t , in v i r tue of 
sec t ion 27 of the s a m e Ac t , t he G o v e r n o r in C o u n c i l — C a b i n e t — also has 
t he p o w e r t o issue, f rom t ime to t ime , " D i r e c t i o n s " t o t he C o m m i s s i o n . 
T h e r e is, the re fore , a priori c o n t r o l as well.3 F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e C R T C itself 
has very wide p o w e r s to m a k e r e g u l a t i o n s a n d set c o n d i t i o n s for l icensees. 4 
M o r e o v e r , u n d e r t he aegis of sec t ion 3, t h e C o m m i s s i o n m a y — a n d d o e s — 
on an ad hoc basis m a k e fa r - reach ing pol icy dec i s ions for wh ich it is n o t 
a c c o u n t a b l e because these dec is ions are seen as fulfilling its m a n d a t e t o 
3. At present, the power to give directions to the Commission is narrowly circumscribed by 
the Act. However, Bill C-20, which was read for the first time on December 20, 1984, would 
amend the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Act, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 49, to 
permit Cabinet to "issue to the Commission a direction concerning any matter that comes 
within the jurisdiction of the Commission" (emphasis added). The scope for a priori 
intervention would thus be almost limitless, save "in respect of the issuance of a 
broadcasting licence to a particular person or the amendment or renewal of a particular 
broadcasting licence" (id.). 
4. This is done in virtue of s. 15 of the Act, which provides as follows : 
15. Subject to this Act and the 
Radio Act and any directions to 
the Commission issued lrom time 
to time by the Governor in Council 
under the authority of this Act, 
the Commission shall regulate and 
supervise all aspects of the Cana-
dian broadcasting system with a 
view to implementing the broad-
casting policy enunciated in section 
3 of this Act. 1967-68, c. 25, s. 15. 
15. Sous réserve de la présente 
loi, de la Loi sur la radio et des 
instructions à l'intention du Con-
seil émises, à l'occasion, par le 
gouverneur en conseil sous l'auto-
rité de la présente loi, le Conseil 
doit réglementer et surveiller tous 
les aspects du système de la radio-
diffusion canadienne en vue de 
mettre en ccuvre la politique de 
radiodiffusion énoncée dans l'ar-
ticle 3 de la présente loi. 1967-68, 
c. 25, art. 15. 
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regulate and supervise the Canadian broascasting system. However, as set 
out above, if the CRTC, in making such an ad hoc regulation, policy, or 
license condition does not conform with the policy objectives articulated (or 
sometimes even unarticulated) by Cabinet, the Governor in Council may set 
the decision aside or refer it back to the Commission for reconsideration and 
hearing. 
It is important to note that section 23(1) is devoid of any guidelines. 
Nowhere, for instance, does it give the specific right to parties who feel 
aggrieved to seek relief by this route, nor does it indicate the procedure 
which Cabinet must follow. In these respects the section is rather unusual as 
a brief examination of two other acts will demonstrate. 
The first is the National Transportation Act,5 which, in section 64(1), 
provides that "The Governor in Council may at any time, either upon 
petition of any party, person or company interested, or of his own motion, and 
without any petition or application, vary or rescind any order, decision, rule 
or regulation of the Commission...".6 Not only, then, does this provision 
permit the Governor in Council to "vary" a decision — a power which 
Cabinet does not possess in broadcasting matters — but it also spells out 
that interested parties may petition the Cabinet to examine their grievances. 
The second example is section 7 of the Criminal Records Act,1 which 
permits the Governor in Council, given certain conditions, to revoke a 
pardon granted by the National Parole Board. This is how the section reads 
in part : 
7. A pardon may be revoked by the Governor in Council 
(b) upon evidence establishing to the satisfaction of the Governor in Council 
(i) that the person to whom it was granted is no longer of good 
conduct, or 
(ii) that such person knowingly made a false or deceptive statement in 
relation to his application for the pardon, or knowingly concealed 
some material particular in relation to such application.8 
5. R.S.C. 1970, c. N-17. 
6. Emphasis added. For an interpretation of this section, see The Jasper Park Chamber of 
Commerce et al. v. Governor General in Council, [1983] 2 F.C. 98, 109 (F.C.A.). See also, on 
this point. L. VANDERVORT, Political Control of Independent Administrative Agencies, Study 
Paper prepared for the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Ottawa, Ministry of Supply 
and Services, 1979, p. 40, and C.C. JOHNSTON, The Canadian Radio-television and 
Telecommunication Commission : A Study of Administrative Procedure in the CRTC, 
(1980), 84. 
7. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-12. 
8. Emphasis added. 
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As can be seen, apart from the case where a person is convicted after a 
grant of pardon, the Governor in Council can act only upon proof which 
meets the standard set out in the Act. Here, then, is a case where a statute 
decrees how Cabinet must deal with an issue, and the key condition is the 
sufficiency of proof. The practical result of this is that where the evidence 
does not meet the minimum standard, the courts will intervene and set aside 
an Order in Council which contravenes the Act.9 
It is instructive to trace the history of section 23 of the present 
Broadcasting Act, a section which is frequently, though incorrectly, said to 
create an appeal to the Cabinet. On second reading in the House of 
Commons of Bill C-163 (which created the Act), the Honourable Judy 
LaMarsh, Secretary of State and Minister responsible for piloting the Bill 
through the House, said of this section : 
There is one important matter with regard to the licensing power to which I 
should refer. It was stated in the white paper that the licensing power would be 
delegated to the regulatory authority — that was a proposal with which the 
standing committee concurred — but that provision would be made for 
appeals against licensing decisions to the governor in council. Although it has 
happened very seldom in the past that the recommendations of the B.B.G. have 
been rejected by the governor in council, the important thing to remember is 
that there have been occasions in the past when such recommendations were 
deemed to be contrary to the public interest, and it is certainly not without 
possibility that such a situation could occur again in the future. 
On closer consideration, Mr. Speaker, it was concluded that formal appeals to 
the governor in council would not be practical, but it is proposed that the 
governor in council should have the power, within a period of 60 days after a 
decision by the commission, to set aside a licensing decision or to refer it back 
to the commission for another public hearing. It should be noted that this does 
not give the government any power to issue a licence, nor does it give the 
government any power to nominate an acceptable licensee.10 
A reading of the Minister's remarks gives us clear guidance as to the 
intention of the government which introduced the Bill. Section 23 was meant 
to be used by the Governor in Council, and only by the Governor in Council, 
9. Desjardins v. Bouchard el ai, (1982) 11 C.C.C. (3d) 167, where the Federal Court of Appeal 
held that, in view of the specific wording of the Act, the revocation of a pardon by Cabinet 
was a quasi-judicial proceeding and therefore subject to the tenets of natural justice. See 
also D. LEMIEUX, Le contrôle judiciaire de l'action gouvernementale, Montréal, C.E.J., 1981, 
p. 221 : "En général, les décisions prises par le Cabinet qu'elles soient à portée générale ou 
individuelle, relèvent de la politique pure. Cependant, les tribunaux ont admis que dans 
certaines situations exceptionnelles, le Cabinet tranchait des droits et devait agir dès lors de 
manière équitable, sinon quasi judiciaire, en permettant aux personnes ainsi affectées d'être 
informées à l'avance afin qu'elles puissent faire des représentations avant que la décision ne 
soit prise." 
10. Hansard, November I, 1967, 3753. 
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to set aside a licensing decision or to refer it back to the Commission for 
reconsideration and hearing. It was never intended to be a general appeal to 
cabinet by applicants, and attempts to apply the section in such a manner 
have not succeeded." But Parliament, in establishing a regulatory tribunal to 
administer almost all aspects of broadcasting, was not prepared to give 
complete control to this new body, and it therefore reserved unto the 
Governor in Council the right to alter the regulatory process on purely 
political grounds. It should, however, be noted that the Minister was clear 
that this was not a power to issue a licence or direct the commission to grant 
a licence to a particular applicant. Read and interpreted this way, there is, 
under the Broadcasting Act, no place for an applicant to seek relief or redress 
if there is a substantial question of policy in issue from the applicant's point 
of view.12 
One must, of course, distinguish between the setting of policy and the 
application of policy. The former, under the Canadian system, is always the 
prerogative of the government, while the latter may be delegated to a 
regulatory body with an expertise in the field, such as the CRTC. Moreover, 
one must distinguish between the function of a court and the function of an 
administrative tribunal. The former never deals with policy ; the latter 
almost always does. Tribunals like the CRTC usually have the right to 
administer and, under certain conditions, even set policy.13 The government, 
therefore, frequently will insert an override provision to keep for itself that 
which, in a cabinet system of government, rightfully belongs to the Cabinet.14 
It is worthwhile at this juncture to examine the traditional notion of 
responsible government, where a Minister explains, defends and accepts 
responsibility for the actions of his department. As Dicey noted,15 "minis-
terial responsibility means [...] in ordinary parlance the responsibility of 
Ministers to Parliament, or, the liability of Ministers to lose their offices if 
they cannot retain the confidence of the House of Commons". However, 
"used in its strict sense", it refers to "the legal responsibility of every 
Minister for every act of the Crown in which he takes part." 
11. Thus, news reports in 1984 that a Quebec City radio station had "appealed to cabinet" did 
not reflect the true situation : see infra, note 41. 
12. Where relief is sought on questions of law or jurisdiction, a motion for leave to appeal may 
be addressed to the Federal Court of Canada : s. 26(1) of the Broadcasting Act. 
13. Sometimes in interpreting s. 3 of the Broadcasting Act, the Commission consciously or 
otherwise will, in fact, make policy decisions. 
14. Similarly, courts do not sanction privative clauses which attempt to oust the right to 
judicial review: see, for instance, J. A. KAVANAGH, A Guide to Judicial Review, 2nd ed., 
Toronto, Carswell, 1984, p. 83. 
15. A.V. DICEY, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10lh ed., London: 
Macmillan; New York : St Martin's Press, 1960, p. 325. 
848 Les Cahiers de Droit (1985) 26 C. de D. 841 
This responsibility was feasible in the mid-nineteenth century, when the 
business of a government department was sufficiently manageable for one 
man to oversee personally. But these circumstances have long-since 
changed,16 and with the rapid growth of state intervention solutions to deal 
with the ever-increasing volume of work had to be found. One response to 
the problem was the creation of administrative bodies — boards, tribunals 
and commissions — which could take over some of the tasks hitherto the 
domain of Ministers and their departments. An early example is given by 
John P. Mackintosh in his work on the British Cabinet : 
In 1834 the Poor Law Commission had been set up as an independent body to 
prevent undue pressure from Parliament. Thirteen years later it was brought 
under the control of the Cabinet and the Commons were told that this was to 
establish a parliamentary spokesman for the Board whom they could question 
and criticize. But at least as strong a motive was the desire to extend the same 
direct ministerial control over the Board as existed over other departments.17 
The same is true today. Parliament declared its wish to create an 
"independent public authority" to regulate and supervise the Canadian 
broadcasting system, bearing in mind the objectives of the "broadcasting 
policy for Canada" enunciated in section 3 of the Broadcasting Act. 
However, in section 23, Cabinet was given, in certain circumstances, an 
ultimate veto. This power is always exercised on the recommendation of the 
Minister of Communications — the Minister "responsible" for the Act. On 
the one hand, then, as was the case in England with the Poor Law 
Commission, the CRTC was given independence, yet government retained a 
vital measure of control.18 In the result, Cabinet may reject a technologically 
sound decision made by experts in favour of a politically acceptable one. 
However, where that is the case, the Minister may ultimately have to answer 
to the House. Thus, political review of regulatory decisions plays an 
important part in the Canadian administrative structure.19 The United 
16. This change was judicially noted in 1910, when Farwell L.J. felt compelled to observe — 
"bitterly", in the view of H. W.R. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th ed., 1982, 30) — that, "if 
ministerial responsibility were more than the mere shadow of a name, the matter would be 
less important, but as it is, the Courts are the only defence of the liberty of the subject 
against departmental aggression" : Dyson v. A.-G., [1911] 1 K.B. 410, 424 (CA.). See also 
R. DUSSAULT, Traité de droit administratif canadien et québécois, Québec, P.U.L., 1974, 
p. 1078: "Aussi, bien que le pouvoir législatif demeure toujours le censeur possible du 
pouvoir exécutif, la relation qui existe entre ces deux pouvoirs peut, sur ce plan, être décrite 
en termes du subordination du premier au second" (footnotes omitted). 
17. J.P. MACKINTOSH, The British Cabinet, 3rd ed., London, Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1977, p. 151. 
18. For a full discussion of the role of administrative agencies in the context of responsible 
government in the U.K., see E.C.S. WADE and G.G. PHILLIPS, Constitutional and 
administrative law, 9th ed., by A.W. Bradley, London, Longman, 1977, p. 97 s. 
19. A good description of this process is found in Independent Administrative Agencies, a 
Working Paper published by the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Ottawa, Ministry of 
D. S. KAUFMAN Cabinet and CRTC 849 
States, on the other hand, have a strong commitment to technocracy and the 
appearance is maintained that a regulatory system which is apolitical exists. 
This is in direct contrast to the Canadian position, where the necessity of 
politics in the regulatory process is acknowledged, while in the United States 
it seems to be hidden.20 Canada openly admits, by including provisions for 
review by cabinet in statutes creating regulatory agencies, that technological 
answers make up only part of the data of the final decision. It is, then, a 
question of political philosophy to decide what is legitimate and necessary in 
the regulation-policy mix, and how abuse of the system can be avoided. 
Historically, the United States Supreme Court is an interventionist 
Court in policy matters. An early American broadcasting case, National 
Broadcasting Co., Inc. et al. v. United States (the "NBC case"),21 addressed 
the issue of whether the Federal Communications Commission had the 
authority to pass special (and far-reaching) regulations to apply to network 
radio stations. Justice Frankfurter, for the majority, held that, in essence, the 
comprehensive network broadcasting regulations enacted by the Commission 
represented a particularization of the Commission's conception of the public 
interest sought to be safeguarded by Congress in enacting the Communications 
Act of 1934.22 Justice Frankfurter outlined the competing policies which the 
Commission had considered before passing the regulations in issue, and 
decided that the Court should not assert its personal views regarding the 
effective utilization of radio and thereby deny that the Commission was 
entitled to promulgate the regulations it had passed. 
In Canada, where the regulatory process is not seen as necessarily 
apolitical, this sort of case might well have given rise to the responsible 
Supply and Services, 1980, p. 87 : "Although appeals to courts are grounded on accepted 
standards and restricted to matters of record or, occasionally, clearly enunciated new 
material, Cabinet 'appeals' are quite different. They are really policy appeals replete with 
lobbying external to any formal written representations made, and allow for reversal on 
grounds of 'evidence' unrelated to the considerations an agency may have regarded as 
relevant. Such review may have a detrimental effect on agencies and detract from the 
integrity of the administrative process in the eyes of those who are parties to proceedings 
before agencies. To be reversed on such an appeal can be demoralizing and can contribute 
to a less than conscientious approach to agency responsibilities. This is particularly so when 
the appeal is not well documented and the reasons obscure." 
20. An example of this is that under the Communications Act of 1934 (which creates the Federal 
Communications Commission), the FCC, an independent federal agency, is responsible 
directly to Congress. The President of the United States is not a member of Congress, nor 
are the members of his cabinet, but it is generally assumed that the President himself vets 
every major FCC decision. Moreover, the only review possible is judicial review by the 
Circuit Courts of Appeal : s. 402 of the Act. 
21. (1943) 319 U.S. 190. 
22. 47U.S.C. 
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Minister raising the issue of "public interest" proprio motu : it certainly 
would not have been left to the courts. 
2. The Interaction of Cabinet and the CRTC 
The above discussion inevitably leads us into an examination of the 
mechanics of Cabinet review. It is essential here to broaden the focus of our 
approach and examine in some detail the inter-relationship between Cabinet 
and independent regulatory agencies and the dynamics of their interaction. 
It is a mistake to believe that the CRTC, the Department of Communi-
cations and the Department of Justice function independently of each other. 
My research indicates that, in fact, they are, informally, in constant contact 
in an effort to oil the machine in the proper places to ensure it will run 
smoothly and efficiently. As a result, section 23 ofthe Broadcasting Act has 
been invoked rarely and has been applied even less often.23 
As seen above, there can be both a priori and a posteriori government 
intervention in the policy-making of the CRTC. An example of the former is 
the Direction 24 issued pursuant to paragraph 22(l)(a) of the Act, respecting 
the issue and renewal of broadcasting licences to daily newspaper pro-
prietors 25 — an a priori limitation of cross-ownership of newspapers and 
broadcasting stations. The accompanying "explanatory note" gives the 
policy reasons behind the Direction : 
This Direction is to ensure that, with certain exceptions, enterprises engaged in 
the publication of daily newspapers shall be prohibited from owning or 
controlling broadcasting undertakings operating in the same market area for 
the general purpose of fostering independent, competitive and diverse sources 
of news and view-points within Canada.26 
There is a good rationale for the issuance of an a priori Direction from 
Cabinet on any issue which involves a fundamental policy decision. For 
instance, Cabinet may wish to make a decision as to whether the government 
will favour one specific technology over another. The issues at stake in the 
23. The Privy Council Office does not keep statistics on this point, but those involved in the 
process suggest that eight to ten petitions are received each year. 
24. See supra, note 3. 
25. P.C. 1982-2294, July 29, 1983. The background and legality of this Direction are discussed 
in New Brunswick Broadcasting Co., Limited v. Canadian Radio-television and Telecommuni-
cations Commission, (1984) 13 D.L.R. (4lh) 77, where the Federal Court of Appeal held the 
Direction to have been validly made. This case is now before the Supreme Court of Canada, 
but note that the Direction was revoked on May 30, 1985: P.C. 1985-1735. 
26. This note does not form part of the Direction, "but is intended only for information 
purposes". 
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consideration of such a decision would go far beyond the broad general 
mandate given the CRTC in section 15 of the Act, "to regulate and supervise 
all aspects of the Canadian broadcasting system with a view to implementing 
the broadcasting policy enunciated in section 3 of this Act". 
On an informal level, there is a constant stream of statements of broad 
government policy which the CRTC is meant to take into consideration in its 
ongoing hearings. Because of the informality the CRTC today could say it 
is not legally bound by the Broadcasting Act (which is why new legislation 
with general policy directives emanating from elected people is thought to be 
necessary by the Minister of Communications).27 Presently, the Minister of 
Communications is powerless to take any action vis-à-vis a CRTC regulation 
he disagrees with for policy reasons. He must wait until that policy is carried 
out, and then his — Cabinet's — only recourse is a posteriori by way of 
section 23 ofthe Broadcasting Act. 
In summary, then, under present legislation, the Cabinet can enforce its 
will only by way of a Direction under section 27 or, under section 23, by way 
of an order setting aside or referring certain decisions back to the Commission 
for reconsideration and hearing. And ultimately, the Governor in Council, 
under section 23(4), may set aside any decision which has been re-heard and 
upheld by the CRTC. However, it is important to note that Cabinet is 
generally loath to change CRTC decisions and that this power is used 
sparingly. In this connection, it should again be emphasized that because the 
CRTC is completely independent in terms of specific decisions it makes, and 
because the Commission does not consult the Department of Communi-
cations regarding particular cases, it seems fitting that the responsible 
Minister, and ultimately the Cabinet, should have the recourse of review and 
revision available in this marriage of the parliamentary system and the 
regulatory process. 
This, of course, puts into question the whole spectrum of the "political 
element" in the decision making of administrative agencies. One can readily 
imagine at one extreme the political element encompassing broad government 
policy and where this should lead, while at the other end, the political 
component would consist of lobbying for personal gain. And somewhere in 
the middle, the political element would embrace the ever-present influence of 
federal-provincial relations.28 Each of these elements, among many others, 
would undoubtedly play a part in the dynamics of the inter-relationship 
between Cabinet and the CRTC. Indeed, CRTC decisions often reflect the 
very real tension between national objectives — the "public interest" — and 
vested private interests. 
27. See supra, note 3. 
28. See also infra, note 40. 
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A former chairman of the CRTC was quoted as saying that Cabinet 
should no longer be allowed to review or overturn Commission decisions 
because "vested interests and lobbyists" can put pressure on Ministers too 
easily. "Appeals to the Cabinet", he said, "undermine the benefits and 
advantages sought in the creation of independent regulatory agencies".29 
And one author stated that "traditional parliamentary mechanisms, such as 
ministerial responsibility, questions, debates and committee investigations, 
are said to no longer provide adequate checks upon the numerous dispersed 
discretions to administrative entities".30 Of course, in appropriate cases, 
relief may be had in the courts, but the rules for review are strict and not 
necessarily efficacious.3I 
3. Past Cases Examined 
It is important at this point to examine various Orders in Council which 
have been issued in virtue of section 23 of the Broadcasting Act. 
The first was an Order dealing with two Manitoba licences. Both 
licences were set aside. The formal document was short and to the point :32 
His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of 
the Minister of Communications, pursuant to section 23 of the Broadcasting 
Act, is pleased hereby to order that the issue by the Canadian Radio-Television 
and Telecommunications Commission of the following broadcasting licences, 
be set aside : 
29. "Curb Cabinet Power over CRTC: Chairman", Globe and Mail, August 11, 1983. The 
Chairman at the time was John Meise). In a similar vein, see C.C. JOHNSTON, supra, note 6, 
p. 85 s., where the author suggests that Cabinet review "can play havoc with principles of 
fairness". 
30. P.G. THOMAS, supra, note l ,p. 125. 
31. See, in general, J.A. KAVANAGH, supra, note 14. 
32. P.C. 1976-2761, November 10, 1976. In a press release issued on the same day, the Minister 
of Communications, Jeanne Sauvé, explained that the action by the Governor in Council 
"was the only means available to allow the CRTC to start afresh and ensure the 
introduction of cable television into these three communities taking into account the new 
federal-provincial agreement". This agreement, the Minister said, would result "in a better 
harmonization of federal and Manitoba interests in communications", while recognizing 
"the responsibility of the Federal Government for the regulation and supervision of all 
broadcasting and broadcast-related services including Pay TV distributed by the Manitoba 
Telephone System, while recognizing the responsibility of the provincial government for the 
regulation and supervision of other telecommunication services distributed within the 
province by the Manitoba Telephone System". While this was the first Order in Council 
issued under s. 23 of the Broadcasting Act, it should be noted that "non-issuance of an 
Order in Council does not necessarily imply that no petitions were submitted": 
L. VANDERVORT, supra, note 6, p. 173. As discussed infra, many petitions never reach 
Cabinet. 
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(a) the licences to serve Selkirk and Portage La Prairie, Manitoba which 
were issued to Winnipeg Videon Limited by CRTC Decision 76-650 of 
September 16, 1976; 
(b) the licence to serve Brandon, Manitoba, which was issued to Grand Valley 
Cablevision Limited by CRTC Decision 76-651 of September 16, 1976. 
In 1982, the CRTC issued several broadcasting licences for the provision 
of pay television in Canada.33 As a condition of licence, five of the licences 
were made subject to an annual Canadian programming expenditure. In 
May 1982, by Order in Council,34 Cabinet decided not to set aside this 
decision nor to refer it back to the Commission for the reason, inter alia, that 
the licensees were required as a condition of licence to devote, on an annual 
basis, a certain percentage of revenues and of their programming expenditures 
to Canadian programmes. However, in July of that year, the condition of 
licence of the annual Canadian programming expenditure requirement was 
amended in each of the five licences to provide that the Canadian 
programming expenditure, although still a condition of licence, should be 
averaged over the entire period of each licence, as opposed to the annual 
expenditure first specified as a condition of licence. These amendments were 
set aside by the Cabinet, proprio motu, pursuant to section 23(1) of the 
Broadcasting Act. The reason given for the Order was brief: "And Whereas, 
the Governor in Council has determined that it is in the public interest to set 
aside the amendments to the said licences made by the Commission...".35 
In June 1982, the Minister of Finance announced the Government's 
Administered Prices Policy — the "6 and 5" programme — which established 
annual limits of 6 and 5 per cent in wage and price increases, save where 
exceptional circumstances existed. This policy was not adhered to in two 
CRTC decisions amending the broadcasting licences of two Quebec licensees, 
Cablevision Nationale Ltée and Télécâble Vidéotron Ltée. In both instances, 
the amendments were in respect of the rates charged for the provision of 
cable television services in certain parts of Quebec, and in both instances the 
CRTC decision allowed rate increases which exceeded the 6 and 5 per cent 
annual limits established by the government. 
In following the recommendations of the Minister of Communications, 
pursuant to section 23 of the Broadcasting Act, and referring the CRTC 
decisions back for reconsideration and hearing by the Commission, the 
Cabinet gave a clear indication of what matters the Commission should have 
turned its mind to and others which it had failed to consider adequately. 
33. Decision CRTC 82-240, March 18, 1982. 
34. P.C. 1982-1509, May 14, 1982. We have no record of how this decision came to the 
Governor in Council for review. 
35. P.C. 1982-2958, September 22, 1982. 
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The Order restated the clearly articulated policy of the government 
establishing wage and price controls. The Cabinet was of the opinion that 
the circumstances which would justify an exception to the government policy 
must be identified and considered by the CRTC. The Cabinet also thought 
that the Commission had failed to identify and consider, or had failed to 
identify and consider adequately, the exceptional circumstances that would 
justify the rate increase which the Commission had authorized. And so, both 
decisions were referred back for reconsideration.36 
Less than two months later, the Cabinet, in similar circumstances, gave 
less guidance to the Commission but was equally categorical in its Order. 
Once again, the CRTC had amended a broadcasting licence — M.S.A. 
Cablevision Ltd. in British Columbia — in respect of installation rates 
charged for provision of cable television service in certain parts of B.C. This 
decision allowed increases in rates in excess of "6 and 5". In this instance, 
Cabinet set aside the decision and gave as its sole reason that it was in the 
public interest to do so.37 
One can, of course, only speculate as to why, in similar cases, in August, 
the Minister would have recommended re-hearings and in October his 
recommendation would be to set aside the decision. It appears, however, 
that the Cabinet, by October, wished to make it perfectly clear that "6 and 
5" was a government policy to which the CRTC would have to adhere unless 
exceptional circumstances existed. If such circumstances existed, the Com-
mission would have to make them known in its decision ; if they did not, and 
the Commission ignored government policy, the Cabinet would exercise its 
powers and set aside the decision. 
These Orders give a good picture of the mechanics of cabinet review 
under section 23(1) of the Broadcasting Act. The CRTC is completely 
independent of any government department in originally coming to a 
decision, but the Cabinet then may always intervene to give guidance or, 
ultimately, overturn a decision which contravenes government policy. In 
that sense, then, the CRTC is not a truly "independent" regulatory agency 
— nor can it be under the Canadian system of government. 
4. The Case of Pay TV 
Policy matters can be enormously complex, and nowhere is this better 
illustrated than in decisions handed down by the CRTC in relation to pay 
TV. On March 18, 1982, the Commission issued a licence to Allarcom 
36. P.C. 1983-2665 and P.C. 1983-2666, August 24, 1983. 
37. P.C. 1983-3238, October 18, 1983. 
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Limited to carry out a regional, general interest pay television service for 
Alberta. At the same time, the Commission also licensed a number of other 
services, including some "of a national general interest". On May 14, 1982, 
the Cabinet decided neither to set aside nor to refer back to the Commission 
the issue of these licences. In the months which followed, the CRTC issued 
two additional broadcasting licences to carry out pay television services in 
Canada. 
All licensees encountered financial difficulties, and these are set out in 
great detail in an Order in Council passed on September 20, 1983,3S which, 
pursuant to section 23 of the Broadcasting Act, referred an amendment 
(which extended Allarcom's service to Manitoba, Saskatchewan and the 
Northwest Territories), back to the CRTC for reconsideration and hearing. 
The Order seemed to indicate that the whole Pay TV policy was counter-
productive and that the market-place had shown the analyses made by the 
CRTC to be wrong. The Cabinet, on the recommendation of the Minister of 
Communications, wanted the CRTC to re-evaluate its policies and their 
implementation to try to turn the tide for Pay TV. Not only was the Cabinet 
of the opinion that the Commission should consider and identify whether 
and to what extent the amendment was in accord with the objectives of the 
Canadian pay television system, as stated by the Commission, "but that this 
should be done in light of the apparent evolution of the overall market 
structure of the Canadian pay television system". 
It is especially interesting to note that the following day, the Honourable 
Francis Fox, the Minister of Communications, issued a statement concerning 
the review by the Cabinet of the Allarcom decision.39 The Order in Council, 
of course, stands on its own. However, several interesting points emerge in 
this statement. 
Firstly, and most importantly, the Minister indicated that the Allarcom 
decision "is one in a series of decisions and events which have the potential 
for transforming the character of the pay television model put in place by the 
CRTC in its original pay TV licensing decision of March 18, 1982". 
Secondly, the Minister made a statement, interesting from a procedural 
point of view, to the effect that the "Governor in Council has received four 
submissions with respect to the CRTC decision amending Allarcom's 
licence. Three, including one from Allarcom itself, support the decision, 
while one asks that it be set aside or referred back to the CRTC for 
38. P.C. 1983-2878. 
39. Statement by Francis Fox, Minister of Communications, Concerning the Review by the 
Governor in Council of Decision CRTC 83-576, Ottawa, September 21, 1983. 
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reconsideration and hearing". The Minister did not, however, say on which 
of the four submissions the Cabinet had acted.40 
Thirdly, Mr. Fox indicated that the Cabinet "does not necessarily 
disagree with the CRTC's decision to extend Allarcom's service", but that he 
did believe that "it is important for the CRTC to provide a further rationale 
for its decision and explain how it now views the future evolution of pay 
television in Canada". This was a clear recommendation by the Minister to 
the Commission to take the initiative to rethink and rearticulate its 
apparently unsuccessful policy regarding Pay TV. 
In March 1984, the CRTC decision not to renew the licence of Quebec 
City station CJMF-FM was "appealed to cabinet".41 However, Mr. Fox said 
that "the commission [...] cannot be overruled on licencing matters by 
cabinet".42 The Act, of course, is clear on that point: non-renewal cannot 
give rise to review under section 23, since it is not the "issue, amendment or 
renewal" of a broadcasting licence. 
Finally, we should consider two recent Orders in Council, both 
involving the Province of Saskatchewan. The first case arose on March 1, 
1984, when the CRTC issued a broadcasting licence to Saskatoon Telecable 
Ltd. Soon after, the Governor in Council received a petition from the 
Government of Saskatchewan requesting that the decision be set aside or 
referred back to the Commission for reconsideration and hearing. It is 
interesting to note that this is the only published Order in Council which 
indicates that the review had been initiated by a provincial government. In 
the event, the Governor in Council decided it was not in the public interest to 
set aside or to refer back the decision.43 
The second case concerned two CRTC decisions which had the effect of 
removing from two Saskatchewan cable systems all signals originating in the 
State of North Dakota, to be replaced by U.S. signals from Detroit, 
Michigan. 
40. Cabinet may, of course, consider a great variety of factors. As P. KENNIFF, D. CARRIER, 
P. GARANT and D. LEMIEUX point out in their study. Le contrôle politique des tribunaux 
administratifs, Québec, P.U.L., 1978, p. 130 : "L'étude que le Comité fait du dossier apporte 
un autre éclairage à celle réalisée au niveau du ministère, car on tient compte de certains 
facteurs qui ne figuraient peut-être pas dans l'approche davantage sectorielle adoptée par le 
ministère. À ce titre, on peut signaler la politique linguistique, les disparités régionales et 
l'impact de la décision sur les relations fédérales-provinciales ou internationales." While 
these observations are still true today, it should be noted that the empirical phase of the 
research for this study was carried out in 1975. 
41. Montreal Gazette, March 30, 1984. 
42. Globe and Mail, March 31, 1984. 
43. P.C. 1984-1387, April 18, 1984. 
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In the words of the petitioner (who stood to lose Canadian commercials), 
this switch ignored a long tradition of "community of interest" 44 between 
North Dakota and Saskatchewan. 
Although the matters in issue were sensitive and important — Canada-
U.S. relations and federal-provincial relations were involved — Cabinet 
nevertheless rejected the petition.45 
5. When and Why Will Cabinet Intervene ? 
The key question which arises is under what circumstances will a 
petition be considered by Cabinet. My research indicates that there are 
between eight and ten petitions filed for cabinet review each year, and only a 
small fraction of that number ever result in Orders in Council. What 
becomes of the others? I am led to conclude that although a citizen may have 
a common law right of petition, he does not necessarily have a right to have 
his petition taken to Cabinet. This right to make a recommendation for 
Cabinet review under section 23 of the Broadcasting Act is, by constitutional 
usage, reserved to the Minister of Communications as the Minister res-
ponsible for administering the Act.46 In theory, the Prime Minister also may 
initiate Cabinet action, but there is no recorded instance when this has 
happened in broadcasting decisions of the CRTC. 
How petitions reach Cabinet and what procedure is followed are 
questions which flow logically from the above. If section 23 were to provide 
a right of appeal to Cabinet from CRTC decisions, then clearly the Cabinet 
would have to turn its mind to any and all petitions. This, however, is not the 
case. The wording of the section makes it clear that the powers granted may 
be exercised with complete discretion. My research indicates that they are. 
Furthermore, rarely are reasons or explanations given for the outcome of 
any petition. 
The following is an analysis of the mechanics of Cabinet review. It 
presupposes that this discussion applies only to the review by Cabinet 
possible under section 23 of the Broadcasting Act.41 
44. Petition of The North Dakota Television Broadcasters, November 19, 1984, i. 
45. P.C. 1984-4060, December 18, 1984. 
46. This is part of the constitutional responsibility of a Minister in a parliamentary democracy : 
see, for instance, F. F. SLATTER, Parliament and Administrative Agencies, a Study Paper 
prepared for the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Ottawa, Ministry of Supply and 
Services, 1983, p. 85 s. 
47. But note that different considerations apply to different enactments. 
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6. Mechanics of Cabinet Review 
Because there is no formal procedure laid down in the Broadcasting Act, 
I have relied on discussions with several persons to ascertain what actually 
happens to a petition made pursuant to section 23. Although it is unclear 
who may be a petitioner, it is certain that the Act allows a review proprio 
motu by the Minister of Communications, and that in all cases the review 
procedure is very informal with no rules or guidelines as to how it should be 
initiated, by whom, or how it shoud be carried out. The only formality 
enunciated in the Act is that the Governor in Council must act within 
60 days of the issue of the decision complained of, so presumably a petition 
must be filed in time for the Cabinet to examine it and decide within this 
delay. There is nothing in the Act to prevent a section 23 petitioner from also 
addressing himself to the Federal Court of Appeal under section 26 of the 
Act. Indeed, one would be wise to attempt both recourses at the same time 
because, under section 26, leave must be sought within one month after the 
making of the decision or order sought to be appealed from. 
Although, as stated above, there is no set procedure,48 the process 
followed is usually this : 
1. A formal or informal petition is lodged somewhere: with the 
Minister of Communications, with the CRTC or sometimes even 
with the Prime Minister. Each will direct it to the Clerk of the Privy 
Council, who will send the petition to the Minister of Commu-
nications. 
2. Upon receipt of the petition, the Minister requests his staff to 
prepare, for his use, an analysis of the issues raised. There is no 
hearing and no-one is told at this stage of the process what is 
happening. Everything is very informal. 
3. The Minister, after assessing the report of his staff, decides whether 
to take the petition to Cabinet. 
4. If the petition is taken to Cabinet, a cabinet document is prepared 
which follows the route of every Cabinet document. 
5. The document may first go to a Cabinet committee and then to the 
full Cabinet. It is at this point that the issues raised are subjected to 
an inter-departmental discussion at the ministerial level. 
48. See, for instance, P. KENNIFF, D. CARRIER, P. GARANT and D. LEMIEUX, supra, note 40, 
p. 127: "La procédure utilisée lors d'une demande d'annulation ou de révision au 
gouverneur en conseil se caractérise par une absence de formalisme et par le secret. Ces 
deux caractéristiques la distinguent de la procédure qui est suivie devant les tribunaux tant 
judiciaires qu'administratifs. L'article 23 n'édicte aucune procédure et puisqu'il ne s'agit 
pas d'un appel proprement dit, on ne peut se rapporter aux règles générales qui régissent les 
appels." 
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6. Where, however, the Minister of Communications decides that no 
policy issue is at stake, he will not present the petition to Cabinet. In 
that case, the petition will go no further, and even though the parties 
need not be informed, it is current practice to do so. 
7. There is no provision for formal or informal oral presentation or 
further written presentation by the petitioner to the Cabinet. There 
is, however, nothing to prevent such a procedure and, in some 
circumstances, it does happen. 
8. Once a petition is with Cabinet, everything is secret. However, a 
former Minister told me that although there are no criteria in most 
acts on which Cabinet may decide, Cabinet will rarely intervene 
against the decisions of an administrative body : "There is a pre-
sumption in favour of the decision of an administrative tribunal and 
Cabinet does not intervene lightly". Furthermore, he indicated that 
while there are political overtones in these decisions, they are not 
necessarily overriding: political sensitivity, regional consideration 
and international treaty commitments all enter into Cabinet decisions. 
However, the essential element is that a decision of a regulatory 
body must always be consistent with government policy. 
9. After Cabinet has met and come to a decision, that decision is then 
made public by Order in Council. 
The lack of procedure with regard to process and form for petitions to 
Cabinet should be remedied. There is an aura of uncertainty and mystery 
about the process which leaves petitioners perplexed and fearful that they 
may be dealt with unfairly. 
Conclusion 
Canada has been clearly influenced by two quite separate notions as to the role 
of administrative agencies. In the United States wide discretionary powers have 
been granted to independent regulatory agencies [...] By contrast the British 
tradition is not to grant similar discretionary powers except to bodies which are 
immediately politically accountable. In drawing on both these traditions 
Canada seeks the best of both worlds. The danger is that it might end up with 
the worst of both — an appearance of political accountability without any of 
the benefits of openness, continuity, and even-handedness which might come 
from independent decision making.49 
As pointed out earlier, the system of Cabinet review is not without its 
critics. The questions raised, apart from those which deal with the lack of 
49. J.M. EVANS, H.N. JANISCH, D. J. MULLAN, R.C.B. RISK, Administrative Law : Cases, Text 
and Materials, 2e ed., Toronto, Edmond-Montgomery Publication Ltd., 1984, p. 703. 
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procedure, go to the heart of the notion of responsible government. This is 
the British tradition, largely followed by Canada, and it may well be, as the 
above quotation suggests, that the Canadian system cannot successfully be 
merged with any other system : the result may indeed be the worst of both 
worlds. 
Section 3 of the Broadcasting Act states "that the objectives of the 
broadcasting policy for Canada enunciated in this section can best be 
achieved by providing for the regulation and supervision of the Canadian 
broadcasting system by a single independent authority". But the very Act 
which speaks of an "independent authority" contains legislative provisions 
— Directions and review — which are clearly incompatible with true 
independence. The use of the word "independent" is, therefore, somewhat 
misleading.50 
Yet, one should not lose sight of the fact that, at present, at least, the 
powers of Cabinet are circumscribed : Directions must meet the criteria set 
out in the Act,51 and the power to set aside or refer back to the Commission 
only applies, in the words of section 23, to the "issue, amendment or 
renewal" of a license. The power to grant a license is reserved to the 
Commission. 
It has not been suggested that Cabinet has abused its ex post facto power 
of review. Intervention has been rare and appears always to have been based 
on government policy. This comports well with what Parliament intended 
when the Broadcasting Act was enacted : to create an agency free from 
partisan political intervention, but nevertheless subject to political control.52 
In the 1982-83 CRTC Annual Report, The chairman, John Meisel, 
wrote : 
Cabinet direction, and the undisputed power of the courts to review the 
Commission's jurisdiction and procedures, are completely adequate mecha-
nisms for ensuring that harmony between the government's goals and the 
Commission's prevails, and that the regulator follows proper procedures. 
Appeals to the Cabinet undermine the benefits and advantages sought in the 
creation of independent regulatory agencies.51 
I do not agree with this point of view. It is not in keeping with the 
Canadian system of responsible government. What the government sought 
to achieve in setting up the CRTC was an informed body with particular 
50. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7lh ed., 1982, defines "independent" as "not depending on 
authority or control ; self-governing". 
51. See supra, note 3. 
52. See supra, note 10. 
53. P. X. 
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expertise which would apply the major policies set by the government. 
Because Canada is such a complex country, there is a need for some 
synthesis of policy. Cabinet Ministers are ultimately politically accountable ; 
this is a feature of Cabinet government. And even though Ministerial 
responsibility in the classic sense is no longer feasible on a day-to-day basis, 
the concept is still very much with us, particularly in important policy 
matters. 
The notion, therefore, of a truly independent regulatory body is 
incompatible with the philosophy of Cabinet government. In the Canadian 
system of public law, political power is seen as an essential element of the 
political process and someone — a Minister or even the Prime Minister — is 
always accountable. The Minister of Communications is responsible for the 
administration of the Broadcasting Act ; therefore, the initial step of cabinet 
review under section 23 of the Act is his. But it must be remembered that 
what sanctifies the political power and authority of the Minister is his 
accountability to Parliament. 
